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Weestimate the pricing of sovereign risk for ﬁfty countries based on
ﬁscal space (debt/tax; deﬁcits/tax) and other economic funda-
mentals over 2005–10. We focus in particular on ﬁve countries in
the South-West Eurozone Periphery, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain. Dynamic panel estimates show that ﬁscal space and
other macroeconomic factors are statistically and economically
important determinants of sovereign risk. However, risk-pricing of
the Eurozone Periphery countries is not predicted accurately either
in-sample or out-of-sample: unpredicted high spreads are evident
during global crisis period, especially in 2010 when the sovereign
debt crisis swept over the periphery area. We match the periphery
group with ﬁve middle income countries outside Europe that were
closest in terms of ﬁscal space during the European ﬁscal crisis.
Eurozone Periphery default risk is priced much higher than the
matched countries in 2010, even allowing for differences in
fundamentals. One interpretation is that these economies switched
to a “pessimistic” self-fulﬁlling expectational equilibrium. An
alternative interpretation is that the market prices not on current
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but future fundamentals, expecting adjustment challenges in the
Eurozone periphery to bemore difﬁcult for than thematched group
ofmiddle-income countries because of exchange rate andmonetary
constraints.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
During 2000–2006, the OECD and most emerging markets experienced a remarkable decline in
macroeconomic volatility and the price of risk. This period turned out to be the tail-end of the Great
Moderation, a precursor of the turbulences leading to the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09, the
consequent increase in risk premia, and the focus on ﬁscal challenges and the importance of ﬁscal
space in navigating future economic challenges. The latter stages of the crisis, unfolding in 2010,
focused attention on the heterogeneity of the Euro block, and the unique challenges facing the ﬁve
South-West Eurozone Periphery countries, or SWEAP group (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain),
in adjusting to ﬁscal fragility in the context of a ten-year old currency union.1
This paper investigates the pricing of risk associated with the sovereign debt crisis that escalated
during 2010 in several European countries, and culminating in the selective default on Greek sovereign
debt in early 2012. Our objective is to determine whether the perception of relatively high sovereign
default risk of the ﬁscally distressed Euro area countries, as seen in market pricing of credit default
swap (CDS) spreads, may be explained by existing past or current fundamentals of debt and deﬁcits
relative to tax revenues –which we term de facto ﬁscal space – and other economic determinants.2 Our
analysis allows us to address several questions. Does ﬁscal space help systematically explain the
evolution of themarket pricing of risk beyond that embedded in othermacroeconomic indicators?Was
risk in some markets (e.g. SWEAP) “overpriced” in 2010 judging by model predictions using the pre-
vailing values of ﬁscal space other macro variables?
Our objectives for the empirical work are three-fold. Firstly, we determine whether CDS spreads (in
a panel regression setting) are related to ﬁscal space measures and other economic determinants.
Secondly, we address whether there is an identiﬁable dynamic pattern to CDS spreads during the crisis
period. Thirdly, we investigate pricing differentials of CDS spreads in the Euro area, and the SWEAP in
particular, compared to other countries. We seek to answer the question of whether Euro area and
SWEAP CDS spreads follow the same pattern as the rest of the world or may they considered “mis-
priced” in some sense, especially during the 2010 European debt crisis.
To this end, we develop a pricingmodel of sovereign risk for a large number of countries (50) within
and outside of Europe, before and after the global ﬁnancial crisis, based on ﬁscal space and other
economic fundamentals including the foreign interest rate, external debt, trade openness, nominal
depreciation, inﬂation, GDP/Capita and economic growth. We use this dynamic panel model to explain
CDS spreads and determine whether the market pricing of risk is comparable in the affected European
countries and elsewhere in the world. By this methodology, and using in-sample and out-of-sample
predictions, we can determine whether there are systematically large prediction errors for the CDS
spreads during the global ﬁnancial crisis and in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis in Europe
intensiﬁed. Systematically large prediction errors may be due to mispricing of risk or may be attrib-
utable to expectations of a future decline in fundamentals that lead to higher default risk. We also
“match,” on the basis of similar ﬁscal space, each SWEAP country with a corresponding Middle Income
country. This provides additional information on the market pricing of risk between SWEAP and
countries with similar ﬁscal conditions but, unlike SWEAP, with histories of debt restructuring.
1 The SWEAP acronym for these ﬁve countries is used in Buiter and Rahbari (2010).
2 Our measure of ﬁscal space is from Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010). They propose a stock and ﬂow measure of de facto ﬁscal
space. The stock variable is deﬁned as the inverse of the tax-years it would take to repay the public debt. In this paper, ﬁscal
space is measured both as outstanding government debt and government deﬁcits, relative to the de facto tax base. The deﬁcits
measure is the realized tax collection, averaged across several years to smooth for business cycle ﬂuctuations.
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Our investigation reveals a complex and time-varying environment in the market for sovereign
default risk. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd empirically a key role of ﬁscal space in pricing sovereign risk,
controlling for other relevant macro variables. The link is economically and statistically strong, and
robust to the time dimension of the CDS premium, sample period, included control variables and
estimation technique. We ﬁnd that risk of default in the SWEAP group appeared to be somewhat
“underpriced” relative to international norms in the period prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis and
substantially “overpriced” countries during and after the crisis, especially in 2010, with actual CDS
values much higher than the model would predict given fundamentals. In addition, compared to the
matched group, controlling for ﬁscal space and macroeconomic conditions, all of the SWEAP countries
have much higher default risk assessments measured by CDS premiums. One potential explanation for
the switch from under- to over-pricing of default risk is that markets were forward looking, not pricing
entirely on current fundamentals but on expected further deterioration in future SWEAP fundamentals,
especially in the realm of ﬁscal space. Alternatively, the results are consistent with multiple equilib-
riumwith an abrupt switch from a “good” (optimistic) expectations equilibrium in the Euro Area –with
low expected default rates and low interest rates where ﬁscal positions are sustainable – to a “bad”
(pessimistic) expectations equilibrium in these same countries – with high expected default rates and
high interest rates where ﬁscal positions are not sustainable.
The next section discusses the data. The third section provides a preliminary statistical analysis. The
fourth section presents the empirical results. We close the paper with a discussion on possible inter-
pretation of the emerging SWEAP risk premia, including the handicapping effect of being a member of
a currency union, which reduces the country’s scope of adjustment via exchange rate and monetary
policy.
2. CDS spreads as a measure of sovereign default risk
2.1. CDS spreads on sovereign bonds
We measure the market perception of sovereign default risk by the spreads on sovereign credit
default swaps (CDS) at variousmaturities (tenors).3 CDS instruments aremainly transacted in over-the-
counter (OTC) derivative markets. The spreads represent the quarterly payments that must be paid by
the buyer of CDS to the seller for the contingent claim in the case of a credit event, in this case non-
payment (or forced restructuring) of sovereign debt, and is therefore an excellent proxy for market-
based default risk pricing.4 The total CDS market grew from about 10 trillion USD in 2004, when
statistics were ﬁrst systematically reported, to a peak prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis of almost 60
trillion USD in mid-2008, and then fell sharply. The estimated gross (net) notional amount of sovereign
CDS outstanding was 2447 (233) billion USD in 2010, compared to about 2196 billion USD in
government-issued international debt securities (BIS, 2010). Fig. 1 shows the outstanding notional
amounts of CDS instruments on sovereign bonds across countries in late February 2011. Italy has the
largest outstanding CDS notional amounts, at almost USD 300 billion, followed by Brazil, Spain and
Turkey with notional amounts outstanding of over USD 150 billion.
Sovereign CDS provide a market-based realtime indicator of sovereign credit quality and default
risk. We consider sovereign CDS spreads at several maturitiesdthree, ﬁve and ten-year maturities,
across industrial countries and emerging markets. Despite the low probability of a credit event in most
advanced economies, CDS markets are still active in most markets as buyers can use the sovereign CDS
3 See Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003) and Fontana and Scheicher (2010) for discussions of sovereign CDS markets.
4 An alternative proxy for default risk is the interest rate spread of sovereign debt. From an empirical standpoint, there are
three main advantages of using CDS spreads rather than interest rate spreads. Firstly, CDS statistics provide timelier market-
based pricing with larger coverage of industrial and developing countries than sources for national bond market rates.
Secondly, using CDS spreads avoids the difﬁculty in dealing with time to maturity as in the case of using interest rate spreads (of
which the zero yields would be preferred). Recent estimates from the Bank for International Settlements suggest that the
average original and the remaining maturities of government debt instruments vary markedly across countries (BIS, 2010).
Thirdly, interest rate spreads embed inﬂation expectations and demand/supply for credit conditions as well as default risk. We
are only interested in default risk.
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as a hedge and for mark-to-market response.5 Buyers of the sovereign CDS may or may not own the
underlying government bonds. The latter case is termed ‘naked’ sovereign CDS, and frequently labeled
as a speculation.
CDS prices in our study are taken from CMA Datavision, a platform that is based on quotes collected
from a consortium of over thirty independent swap market participants. CMA aggregates the most
recent quotes and delivers the data intraday. The quoting convention for CDSs is the annual premium
payment as a percentage of the notional amount of the reference obligation. The sovereign CDS spreads
are reported in basis points, with a basis point equals to $1000 to insure $10 million of debt.6 CDS
spreads are London closing values. While CMA is not the sole provider of CDS prices, Mayordomo et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that, in a comparison of six major providers, CMA quotes are most consistent with a price
discovery process. The majority of sovereign CDS in the market are denominated in the US dollar; in
our sample, about one-third of the CDS is Euro-denominated. The CMA data set provides a broad
coverage of CDS pricing over countries and years.
Appendix A provides data sources and Appendix B a list of countries in the entire sample, the subset
of countries included in the empirical estimation, and means of 3, 5 and 10-year CDS spreads (in basis
points), ﬁscal space and other macroeconomic indicators during the sample (2005–10).
2.2. Empirical studies on CDS spreads
Empirical studies of CDS (corporate and sovereign) are relatively new and usually deal with market
microstructure issues. Our study, by contrast, is in line with the macro/international ﬁnance literature
which considers macroeconomic determinants of country risk assessments and ﬁnancial crises.
Several ﬁndings are particularly relevant to our analysis. As noted by Packer and Suthiphongchai
(2003) and others, the CDS premium should in principle be approximately equal to the credit spread
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Fig. 1. Global sovereign CDS positions in early 2011. This ﬁgure provides the gross notional amount of outstanding sovereign CDS
positions (billion US$) as of February 25, 2011. Source: Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).
5 Sovereign CDS can also be used to supplement corporate CDS to hedge for country risk.
6 For example, if the spread is 197 basis points, meaning 197,000 USD to insure against 10,000,000 in sovereign debt for 10
years; 1.97% of notional amount needs to be paid each year, so 0.0197  10 million ¼ $197,000 per year.
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of the reference bond of the same maturity under certain conditions. However, Fontana and Scheicher
(2010) demonstrate that the “basis”, i.e. difference between CDS spreads and the spreads on the
underlying government bonds, was not zero in Eurozone CDS markets during late 2010. They suggest
that sizable deviations are attributable to limits to arbitrage and slowmoving capital. Secondly, at high
frequency (intraday), differences in credit quality (measured by CDS prices) are found to explain
sovereign yield spreads of the Euro area governments (Beber et al., 2009).7 Fontana and Scheicher
(2010) argue that high CDS premium in late 2010 during the Eurozone debt crisis may be partly
attributable to a decline in the appetite for credit-risky instruments and falling market liquidity rather
than entirely due concerns about principle losses on outstanding sovereign debt. In addition, empirical
research ﬁnds that daily sovereign interest spreads are more likely to lead sovereign CDS spreads in
emerging markets (Ammer and Cai, 2007).8 Taken together, both studies suggest that sovereign
interest rates and CDS spreads have common underlying causes, rather than one driving the other. This
is consistent with other work where some studies indicate that price discovery ﬁrst occurs in the CDS
market and follows in the bond market, and vice versa.9
There is evidence that CDS spreads may be driven by macroeconomic conditions. Amato (2005)
decomposes CDS spreads into risk premium and risk aversion and ﬁnds that both are inﬂuenced by
macroeconomic conditions. Packer and Zhu (2005) ﬁnd that contractual terms inﬂuence CDS spreads,
but that signiﬁcant “regional effects” (differential pricing across regions) is also evident. Micu et al.
(2006) also ﬁnd that credit rating announcements have a large inﬂuence on CDS spreads. In explain-
ing recent developments, Berndt and Obreja (2010) suggest that “economic catastrophe risk” rose
sharply in 2007–08 pushing up CDS spreads. Cecchetti et al. (2010) plot several ﬁscal indicators against
CDS spreads for advanced economies. They ﬁnd correlations across countries with substantial hetero-
geneity.10 Longstaff et al. (2011) study sovereign CDS of several emergingmarkets fromOctober 2000 to
January 2010. They found that the sovereign spreads are more associated with global factors (US stock,
treasury, and high yield markets) than local factors (stock return, exchange rate, and foreign reserve).
Dooley and Hutchison (2009) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial, economic and regulatory “news” emanating from the
U.S. during the global ﬁnancial crisis quickly impacted sovereign CDS spreads in emerging markets.
Concerns about price determination, systemic risk to the ﬁnancial system, and the general opacity
of the over-the-counter markets (where CDS is now traded) have led to calls more government
regulation and for CDS to be traded on organized exchanges. Presently CDSs are not traded on an
exchange and there is no required reporting of transactions to a government agency. One reason for the
traditionally limited government oversight is that OTC markets are considered wholesale markets for
professional participants, rather than retail investors. However, the recent ﬁnancial turmoil has shown
that OTC derivative markets can negatively affect other functioning ﬁnancial markets and can be
a serious risk to the health of the banking system. These observations have led to increasing calls for the
regulation and oversight CDS markets. For example, in the event that regulatory reforms require that
CDS be traded and settled via a central exchange/clearing house, there would no longer be ‘counter-
party risk’, as the risk of the counterparty will be held with the central exchange/clearing house.11
3. Statistical contours
Monthly 5-year CDS spreads from 2005 to 2011 are plotted for the SWEAP and other selected
countries (countries which are matched with the SWEAP group, discussed below) in Fig. 2. Judging by
7 Beber et al. study microstructure data of bond quotes and transactions from the interdealer markets, covering Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France Germany Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Their sample period is April 2003–December
2004.
8 Ammer and Cai examine daily data from February 2001 to March 2005, covering Brazil, China, Colombia, Mexico,
Philippines, Turkey, and Uruguay. On interest rates, CDS spreads, and speculation, see also the discussion of ﬁndings from the
European Commission (Tait and Oakley, 2010), which suggests no strong causality between the two.
9 See Carboni (2011) for a recent review of the empirical literature on this point.
10 For example, they plot the forecast level of general government debt/GDP against January 2010 CDS spreads for 21
advanced economies and ﬁnd a positive correlation.
11 Kiff et al. (2009) discuss systemic risk and calls and government regulation policy options in the CDS market.
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these spreads, ﬁnancial stress in global markets emerged in early 2008 but became dramatic and
widespread in late 2008. The turbulence subsided by mid-2009 in most countries, with the notable
exception of the SWEAP group: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. For Greece, the unraveling of
its ﬁscal condition in late 2009 resulted in a manifold increase in sovereign CDS spreads. For Ireland,
the sovereign CDS spreads havewiden sharply twice, in early 2009 and in late 2010. By 2010, spreads of
the SWEAP group were already much higher than those of most emerging market countries (e.g. above
the spreads of South Africa, Mexico, Panama, Malaysia and Colombia in Fig. 2). On the other hand,
sovereign spreads of Germany and the US remained very low throughout the period (not shown).
Table 1 reports the annualmean values (standard deviation inparentheses) of sovereign CDS spreads
(5-year tenor), ﬁscal space and macroeconomic fundamentals for SWEAP and other country groupings.
The table showsaverage values for the period before crisis (2005–07) andduring the crisis (2008–10 and
individual years). The fall of 2008was theheightof theglobalﬁnancial crisis,while the latter partof 2009
was a recoveryperiodasﬁnancial panic and the liquiditycrisis subsided formost countries.However, the
SWEAP sovereign debt crisis manifested mainly in 2010 and later. Prior to the crisis, SWEAP CDS values
were quite low, ranging from 8 to 17 basis points on average, which are somewhat but not markedly
higher than themean of other Euro countries (11 basis points) and lower than the non-Euro OECDgroup
(35 basis points). During the early months into the global ﬁnancial crisis, 2008–09, sovereign CDS
spreads rose in virtually every country. However, spreads dropped very substantially in all regions by
2010 except for the Euro area excluding SWEAP, where it remained roughly unchanged, and SWEAP,
where it rose dramatically. SWEAP CDS average values in 2010 ranged from 238 basis points in Italy to
1027 basis points in Greece. By contrast, in 2010, OECD countries (non-Euro members) had an average
CDS spread of 118 basis points and non-SWEAPEuromembers had an average spread of 101 basis points.
As our main objective is to investigate the link between ﬁscal space and the pricing of default risk,
we also track the adjustment of ﬁscal capacity across countries. Table 1 shows the ﬁscal balance to tax
base ratio and the public debt to tax base ratio. OECD (excluding the Euro countries) and non-SWEAP
Euro countries experienced an increase in debt/tax ratios by 0.2 percent and 0.3 percent, respectively,
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between 2005 and 07 and 2010. For Ireland and Greece, the deterioration in ﬁscal circumstances was
muchmore drastic: the government debt of Ireland climbed from 25% of GDP in 2007 to almost 100% of
GDP in 2010, while the government debt of Greece grew from95% to over 140%. As a result, the debt/tax
ratio of Ireland jumped from 0.9 to 3.2 and that of Greece from 3.2 to 4.5, leaving both countries with
a much less room for a ﬂexible policy response on the ﬁscal side. The large increase of debt/tax ratios in
both countries captures a high degree of distress in their economic fundamentals, including the
government assumption of banking sector liabilities in the case of Ireland. Similarly large deteriora-
tions in ﬁscal space for these countries are also evident in the fall in ﬁscal balance to tax ratios.
We illustrate further the 2005–07 ﬁscal preconditions, as measured by debt/tax (and debt/gdp) and
deﬁcit/tax (deﬁcit/gdp), in the two panels of Fig. 3 by country group. Lower pre-crisis government debt
and lower ﬁscal deﬁcits relative to the tax base imply greater ﬁscal capacity. The ﬁgure shows that ﬁscal
space was weakest (highest levels of debt and deﬁcits relative to the tax base) in the middle-income
countries, although the average debt to gdp ratio was lower than the other groups. This reﬂects
generally lower tax bases in the middle income countries. Generally, the SWEAP had more limited
ﬁscal space during the tranquil period than other high-income groups – higher average debt and
deﬁcits to the relative to the tax base (despite a signiﬁcant budget surplus in Ireland during this
period), and a higher level of debt to GDP.
4. Methodology and empirical results
4.1. Methodology
The dependent variables in our formal empirical work are sovereign CDS spreads of 5 year maturity
(regressions with 3 and 10-year maturities are shown in the appendix table),12 estimated in a panel
regression, yit ¼ ai þ lt þ qDyit1 þ X0itbþ 3it; where y is the CDS spread, i stands for country and t for
year; X is a vector of controls. The sample covers a panel of 50 countries from 2005 to 2010. The vector
X includes ﬁscal space (government debt/tax and ﬁscal deﬁcit/tax)dthe focus of our workdas well as
several other variables that frequently employed in the literature to explain country risk. These variables
are theTEDspread, external debt (total foreign liabilities/GDP), tradeopenness (trade/GDP) and inﬂation.
As the conditions for consistent estimation in the dynamic panel are known to be demanding, our
solution is to work with both a simple ﬁxed-effects model and other estimation speciﬁcations,
including clustered standard errors and the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator. Arellano-Bond is
a GMM estimator with instruments (exogenous and lagged values), well suited to the problem at hand,
with a substantially larger number of cross-section units (50 countries), but requires many period of
data as the instruments to account for the correlation of lagged dependent variable and the unobserved
error terms. We consider ﬁxed effects, clustered standard errors, and GMM in several variants of the
model as bounding the causal effects of interest. The sovereign spreads are estimated in level. We also
consider for GMM the dependent variable in log multiplied by a hundred, allowing the coefﬁcients to
be interpreted in terms of a percentage change of sovereign default risks (this terminology also aligns
with standard practice in the ﬁnancial sector that discusses the percentage change of CDS spreads).
4.2. Dynamics of CDS spreads and Euro/SWEAP pricing differentials
Table 2 considers the dynamics and structure of CDS pricing over the 2005–10 sample period.
Differential pricing for the SWEAP and other Eurozone countries (non-SWEAP) is investigated. To focus
on CDS pricing dynamics during the global and European ﬁnancial turmoil, we include time dummy
variables (t2008–t2010) for three crisis years: 2008 is identiﬁed as the central part of the global
ﬁnancial crisis, 2009 is identiﬁed as a partial recovery period, and 2010 is identiﬁed with the SWEAP
12 Our CDS data set contains 1–10 year maturities. We focus on the 5-year maturity since this is the deepest and most actively
traded CDS market. While there is no precise international account of government debt maturity, recent statistics suggest that
the average original maturity of central government debts is around 10 years for both emerging markets and industrial countries
(BIS, 2010). Hence, we also report results for 10-year maturities in the appendix, as well as 3-yearmaturities for a robustness test.
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debt crisis and post-global ﬁnancial crisis. We also include interaction terms between the three time
dummy variables and the SWEAP countries (dummy variables denoting a SWEAP country) and
between the three dummy variables and the non-SWEAP Euro countries.
In all of the CDS spread regressions, the ﬁscal space measure (higher value is equivalent to lower
ﬁscal capacity) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level – higher levels of sovereign
debt and ﬁscal positions (deﬁcit or debt) relative to the tax base signiﬁcantly increase market pricing of
sovereign default risk. Speciﬁcally, a percentage point rise in the debt/tax ratio is estimated to increase
the 5-year CDS spread by between 15 and 81 basis points, while a one percentage point rise in the ﬁscal
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Fig. 3. Fiscal space in 2005–07. Public debt/GDP divided by tax base (an average tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years). Fiscal
balance/GDP divided by tax base (an average tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years).
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balance to tax base ratio is estimated to lower the spread by 194–829 basis points. Thewide variation in
the estimates, all highly statistically signiﬁcant, varies with the speciﬁc estimation methodologydthe
low estimates are associated with estimation with clustered standard errors and the high estimates
associated with ﬁxed effects estimation. Of the control variables, only inﬂation is systematically and
robustly correlated with CDS spreads (higher inﬂation leads to higher spreads). Appendices C.1 and C.2
provide the robustness checks, supporting the effect of ﬁscal conditions on sovereign spreads in
different econometric speciﬁcations.13
All of the coefﬁcients on the 2008–10 year dummy variables are economically large and statistically
signiﬁcant. Controlling for other factors, sovereign spreads in 2008 were 295–349 points higher than
average rates over the 2005–10 period for full sample of countries. Spreads were much lower in 2009,
by some estimates somewhat lower than sample average spreads, but rose somewhat on average in
2010. For the full sample, the ﬁnancial crisis impact on CDS spreads was concentrated in 2008.
For Euro countries, including the SWEAP group, sovereign spreads were substantially less than the
international average in 2008. SWEAP CDS were spreads were 159–249 points lower than average
spreads prevailing in 2008. SWEAP spreads were somewhat above the average in 2009 and then rose
sharply in 2010, recording levels 174–324 points above average. It is evident that sovereign default risk
in the SWEAP was differentially priced much higher than the average of other countries, and moved in
Table 2
Dynamics of CDS spreads.
Balanced (whole) sample: 2005–10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
t2008 295.6 (78.3)*** 334.1 (102.3)*** 328.0 (78.0)*** 349.3 (97.5)***
t2009 35.4 (27.7) 4.7 (21.0) 36.8 (33.7) 35.5 (16.7)**
t2010 92.9 (27.1)*** 58.8 (12.7)*** 2.5 (32.6) 42.5 (14.0)***
t2008  Euro dummy 209.5 (80.7)*** 216.0 (84.5)** 225.3 (82.3)*** 238.6 (80.3)***
t2009  Euro dummy 15.0 (30.8) 80.5 (30.4)*** 14.6 (30.1) 84.2 (29.4)***
t2010  Euro dummy 29.1 (28.0) 56.2 (24.3)** 5.2 (26.6) 48.0 (26.5)*
t2008  SWEAP 159.3 (82.7)* 194.4 (93.2)** 249.5 (98.2)** 235.6 (86.6)***
t2009  SWEAP 73.4 (36.1)** 136.1 (30.8)*** 18.7 (58.6) 113.8 (34.1)***
t2010  SWEAP 261.9 (63.7)*** 324.4 (58.1)*** 174.4 (107.9) 287.7 (53.6)***
TED spread 7.3 (27.8) 0.8 (13.6) 3.2 (27.3) 1.3 (11.3)
y(t  1) 0.3 (0.1)*** 0.3 (0.1)*** 0.2 (0.1)*** 0.3 (0.0)***
Trade/GDP 118.0 (128.8) 24.9 (29.2) 86.1 (150.7) 41.9 (28.1)
Inﬂation 19.8 (10.3)* 24.6 (6.2)*** 24.5 (11.9)** 23.8 (6.0)***
External debt/GDP 1.9 (17.9) 7.9 (2.3)*** 36.6 (30.1) 3.7 (2.3)
Public debt/tax base 81.0 (29.9)*** 14.7 (3.9)***
Fiscal balance/tax base 829.4 (302.0)*** 194.1 (55.9)***
Constant term 710.7 (347.2)** 87.7 (25.6)*** 286.0 (271.7) 37.3 (26.0)
R2 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.48
Observations 300 300 300 300
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50
Fixed effects (i) Yes No Yes No
Serial correlation y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1)
Clustered s.e. (i) No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 5-year tenor in basis points. South-West Euro Area Periphery (SWEAP) includes
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Tax base is an average tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. TED spread (3-month
US$ LIBOR  3-month US treasury) and Inﬂation are in percent. All variables are in realtime (t), except the lagged CDS, y(t  1).
Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical signiﬁcance at 1 (5,10) level.
13 For GMMestimation, the test statistics (p-values reported) indicate that these dynamic panel regressions performwell on the
whole sample. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions has a null hypothesis of exogenous instruments; in all cases, cor-
responding p-values of the Sargan test cannot reject the null. The AR(1) test has a null of no autocorrelation in ﬁrst differences and
the AR(2) test has a null of no autocorrelation in levels; in most cases, the test cannot reject that average autocovariance in
residuals of order 1 [AR(1)] is 0, whereas the results from AR(2) test are inconclusive (given that time dimension of the panels in
GMM is constrained to 6 at most, 2005–10, subject to the construction of the lagged instrument values). The Sargan test provides
some level of conﬁdence that the residuals are uncorrelated with a group of explanatory variables.
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the opposite direction of the international trend in 2010. Risk assessments were falling around most of
the world in 2010 but rising sharply in the SWEAP group.
4.3. CDS spreads, fundamentals and structural change
The focus on dynamics highlight how SWEAP experienced much higher CDS spreads than most of
the world in 2010, even controlling for their deteriorating ﬁscal situation and other factors. Table 3
considers stability issues by estimating the model over the full balanced sample, 2005–10 (columns
1–4), pre-crisis sample (2005–07, columns 5–8) and crisis sample (2008–10, columns 9–12). The sub-
samples are symmetric by including the same set of countries over a period of three years. The same set
of control variables is also included in these regressions, with a focus on ﬁscal space, but the time
dummies and interactive terms are excluded.
The estimates for the full sample in Table 3 are included for comparison with the results in Table 2
which include time dummies and interactive terms. The results, not surprisingly, are very similar. And
the results are robust to whether actual or “structural” (cyclically adjusted) ﬁscal space measure (ﬁscal
balance divided by tax base) are used in the regressions, shown in Appendix C.3. However, important
differences are evident in the estimates from the two sub-samples. In particular, all of the ﬁscal space
estimates are highly statistically and economically important in the pre-crisis “tranquil” 2005–07
sample, shown in columns 5–8. Debt and deﬁcits relative to the tax base clearly lead to much higher
risk assessments and CDS spreads.
As noted, a structural break appears to have occurred during the turbulent 2008–10 crisis episode,
shown in columns 9–12. During the crisis, pricing of risk is largely decoupled from our two ﬁscal space
measures. The ability of the model to explain CDS spreads drops from around 70–80% in the tranquil
period to 45–60% during the crisis. Although explanatory power of ﬁscal space measures drop during
the crisis, the TED spread, trade openness, external debt and inﬂation play a larger role. Given turbulent
conditions during the crisis period, markets apparently did not focus on current ﬁscal fundamentals.
One interpretation is that the markets simply overreacted and mispriced risk of default. Another
interpretation is that markets may have emphasized more on expectations of future deterioration in
ﬁscal space that were not fully reﬂected in current economic conditions.14 The emergence of the TED
spread as a key pricing factor in the crisis also suggests that expectations of market volatility jumped
during the crisis and that this pushed up CDS spreads. In particular, possible default implies that the
payoff to creditors is weakly concave (ﬁxed payoff in good times, declining with an adverse shock
above a threshold in bad times), suggesting that higher volatility will reduce the expected payoff in
countries exposed to higher volatility during a crisis for a given debt/tax or debt/gdp and thereby
increasing CDS spreads.15 This also explains the impact of the end of the Great Moderationdcountries
with greater exposure to volatility, other things equal, are facing higher spreads.
4.4. SWEAP and the euro-area CDS pricing before and during the crisis
In order to determine how the balanced sample (2005–10) and pre-crisis sample (2005–07) models
of Table 3 predict for various country groups and the SWEAP countries, we report the in-sample and
out-of-sample prediction errors over various years in Table 4. Our objective is to determine whether
prediction errors demonstrate a discernable pattern. The in-sample prediction errors are estimated
14 We also investigated whether the pricing of CDS spreads amongst the SWEAP and the non-SWEAP Euro countries (Euro-
SWEAP) respond differently to fundamentals than the rest of world when the full set of fundamental explanatory variables is
included. We estimated the model over 2005–10, reﬂecting the full sample and consisting of both the tranquil and turbulent
periods. We focused on 10-year CDS spreads and considered interaction terms of SWEAP and Euro-SWEAP with all of the
fundamental variables. The point estimates of interaction terms on government debt/tax suggest that the non-SWEAP Euro area
countries have much narrower spreads than the sample average and the SWEAP area have much larger spreads. However, these
differences are not statistically signiﬁcant. The same result holds for the other fundamental factors. One exception is the trade
openness variable: on average, trade openness is positively associated with CDS spreads, but less than average for non-SWEAP
Euro area and more than average for SWEAP. We omit these results for brevity. They are available upon request.
15 A related point is made by Aizenman and Marion (2002).
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from the full sample model estimates reported in column 3 of Table 3 and the out-of-sample errors are
estimated from the pre-crisis sample estimates reported in column 9 of Table 3.
For exposition purposes, we calculate the prediction errors in Table 4 as a ratio of the actual relative
to the predicted CDS spreads as:
Prediction Error ¼ yit
ypit
¼ Actual 5-yr: CDS spread
Predicted 5-yr: CDS spread
Hence, if the prediction error is greater than 1, we have a case of under-prediction which provides
supportive evidence that the CDS is over-priced. Table 4 reports the prediction errors by individual
SWEAP countries and countrygrouping for the2008–10 andabreakdown for years 2008, 2009 and2010.
Table 3
CDS spreads, fundamentals and structural change.
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years 2005–10 Years 2005–10 Years 2005–10 Years 2005–10 Years 2005–07 Years 2005–07
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
TED spread 29.6 (38.7) 17.5 (12.1) 64.1 (42.2) 43.6 (13.2)*** 34.5 (10.2)*** 23.2 (7.7)***
y(t  1) 0.3 (0.1)*** 0.3 (0.0)*** 0.2 (0.1)*** 0.3 (0.0)*** 0.0 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1)***
Trade/GDP 186.7 (168.9) 1.2 (21.9) 182.7 (182.2) 12.4 (25.3) 92.8 (50.8)* 14.0 (9.3)
Inﬂation 38.6 (12.3)*** 28.1 (3.0)*** 35.7 (12.9)*** 29.9 (3.5)*** 9.8 (2.2)*** 8.7 (1.3)***
External
debt/GDP
57.0 (32.9)* 17.0 (3.5)*** 53.9 (37.2) 9.8 (4.7)** 13.7 (11.2) 0.6 (1.3)
Public debt/
tax base
48.2 (48.7) 13.8 (4.6)*** 123.4 (33.1)*** 18.3 (3.0)***
Fiscal balance/
tax base
910.3 (236.2)*** 418.7 (87.1)***
Constant term 389.5 (541.5) 87.3 (20.7)*** 501.7 (267.5)* 82.5 (30.0)*** 81.9 (100.1) 44.1 (10.9)***
R2 0.19 0.35 0.18 0.35 0.84 0.76
Observations 300 300 300 300 150 150
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fixed effects (i) Yes No Yes No Yes No
Serial
correlation
y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1)
Clustered
s.e. (i)
No Yes No Yes No Yes
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Years 2005–07 Years 2005–07 Years 2008–10 Years 2008–10 Years 2008–10 Years 2008–10
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
TED spread 21.7 (7.7)*** 24.9 (6.6)*** 150.2 (42.1)*** 190.6 (65.7)*** 186.7 (45.1)*** 197.3 (62.8)***
y(t  1) 0.2 (0.1)*** 0.5 (0.1)*** 0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.0)*** 0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.0)***
Trade/GDP 58.9 (37.5) 24.6 (9.1)*** 489.7 (244.5)** 94.5 (63.7) 191.4 (199.6) 96.4 (65.2)
Inﬂation 6.5 (1.7)*** 7.5 (1.4)*** 29.5 (11.6)** 52.2 (5.3)*** 27.2 (9.0)*** 52.9 (5.2)***
External
debt/GDP
5.2 (9.6) 1.4 (1.4) 189.3 (138.7) 28.6 (13.0)** 33.0 (102.2) 21.5 (12.2)*
Public debt/
tax base
182.1 (218.7) 14.4 (13.1)
Fiscal balance/
tax base
291.7 (86.5)*** 202.9 (40.2)*** 567.4 (606.0) 150.7 (163.8)
Constant term 107.4 (78.7) 6.8 (12.4) 621.4 (1134.7) 82.0 (64.0) 200.3 (801.8) 61.9 (59.9)
R2 0.89 0.68 0.58 0.45 0.61 0.45
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fixed effects (i) Yes No Yes No Yes No
Serial
correlation
y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1)
Clustered
s.e. (i)
No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 5-year tenor in basis points. Tax base is an average tax/GDP over a period of previous
5 years. TED spread (3-month US$ LIBOR  3-month US treasury) and Inﬂation are in percent. All variables are in realtime (t),
except the lagged CDS, y(t 1). Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical signiﬁcance at 1 (5,10) level.
J. Aizenman et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 34 (2013) 37–5948
Author's personal copy
The table shows that in-sample and out-of-sample prediction errors were very substantial across
countries and country-groups during the crisis period, with out-of-sample errors particularly large.
Average errors over 2008–10, for example, indicate that actual CDS spreads exceeded out-of-sample
forecast spreads with multiples ranging from 2.3 (Middle Income countries) to 12.9 (non-Euro OECD).
Under predictions of CDS spreads of thismagnitude are extraordinary. Under predictions (out-of-sample)
for the SWEAP countries are not particularlyhigh in relative terms, ranging from2.6 (Italy) to 5.3 (Ireland).
However, the pattern across years of the crisis sample shows a divergence between the SWEAP and
other country groups. In particular, the SWEAP prediction errorswere relatively low in 2008 but climbed
marked in 2010 compared to other regions (except the non-SWEAP Euro area). The ﬁnancial crisis that
emerged in 2008 struck the OECD (non-Euro) area particularly hard, with very high out-of-sample
prediction errors (31.6). These errors were only 1.6 in 2009, and climbed to 5.4 in 2010. By contrast,
the SWEAP area did not experience such dramatic prediction errors in 2008 but these errors rosemarked
in 2009 andespecially 2010. Perhaps reﬂecting some contagious effect, theEuro area (excluding SWEAP),
also experience a dramatic climb in prediction errors in 2010dmuch larger than the SWEAP group.
4.5. Preconditions: ﬁscal positions prior to the ﬁnancial crisis
Fig. 3 suggests that, in the run up to the global ﬁnancial crisis, ﬁscal positions in the Euro area were
relatively strong, and the SWEAP area roughly in line with other OECD countries. The ﬁgure shows the
ﬁscal balance and public debt positions by country group – middle income, high income (non-OECD),
SWEAP, OECD (non-Euro area) and the Euro area (non-SWEAP) – before the global ﬁnancial crisis: the
2005–07 average for ﬁscal balance toGDP and ﬁscal balance to tax base in the ﬁrst part of the ﬁgure, and
the 2005–07 average public debt toGDPand public debt to tax base ratio in the second part of theﬁgure.
Fiscal conditions in Euro countries less the SWEAP were in line with other countries prior to the
global ﬁnancial crisis. The average debt/tax ratio (1.38) was lower than the average of other OECD
countries (1.66). The Euro area debt/GDP (55%) was slightly higher than other OECD countries (51%).
The SWEAP group had a somewhat worse ﬁscal position, but not markedly so, with an average debt/tax
Table 4
Prediction errors of sovereign CDS spreads.
Country/group Out (in) sample
prediction
Prediction error ¼ actual CDS values divided by predicted CDS values
2008 2009 2010 2008–10
Spain out 3.9 3.6 6.5 4.7
in 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.8
Greece out 2.7 2.2 3.3 2.7
in 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.9
Ireland out 4.2 3.8 7.9 5.3
in 0.8 1.7 2.6 1.7
Italy out 2.6 1.6 3.6 2.6
in 2.3 1.9 3.3 2.5
Portugal out 2.8 2.9 6.9 4.2
in 3.2 4.0 4.5 3.9
Middle-income group out 3.9 1.0 1.8 2.3
in 2.7 1.2 1.2 1.7
OECD (non Euro) out 31.6 1.6 5.4 12.9
in 2.6 1.2 1.4 1.7
Euro (excluding SWEAP) out 5.0 5.8 13.7 8.2
in 2.1 4.2 3.2 3.2
Based on the predicted values from estimation in Table 3 (eqs. (3) and (9)) using CDS 5-year tenor. The out-sample prediction uses
2005–07 (pre-crisis period) observations. The in-sample prediction uses 2005–10 (whole sample) observations. Where actual
CDS > predicted CDS, there is a signal of under-prediction (i.e. the sovereign default risk is over-priced). The min and max provide
lowerandupper boundsofpredictionerrorsextracted fromthe all the speciﬁcationswithﬁscal balance/taxbaseandmacro controls.
The bold numbers indicate in-sample prediction errors, as opposed to out-of-sample errors.
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ratio of 1.94 over the period, somewhat above the non-Euro OECD group average (1.66). This is much
less than the average for the middle income group (2.75). However, the SWEAP debt to GDP ratio was
higher than the other groups at an average 68% over the period running up to the ﬁnancial crisis. A
similar pattern is seen for ﬁscal balance measures, shown in the second part of Fig. 3.
Are ﬁscal conditions prior to the crisis linked to market responses during the crisis episode? To
recall, in the years leading to the Euro, prominent US economists were skeptical about the Euro project,
raising questions about the logic of monetary uniﬁcation without deep ﬁscal uniﬁcation. Arguably, the
ﬁrst ten years of the Euro, celebrated in 2008, were taken by the market and key observers as an
illustration that the earlier ﬁscal concerns were overblown. This viewwas supported by the remarkable
switch of the initial depreciation of the Euro against the US dollar, into a solid appreciation. In his
Keynote at Frankfurt am Main 30 May 2008, “The Eurosystem and its Prospects – History in the
Making” Professor Axel Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, noted
“In 1998, however, the kick-off of the Eurosystem was regarded not only with curiosity and opti-
mism, but also with concern and skepticism. On the one hand, pessimists predicted that the euro
would be short-lived. They didnotwant to partwith their respective national currencies,which – as
in the case of the D-Mark – had often evolved into a symbol of national identity. On the other hand,
the euro’sproponentsbelieved that the single currencywouldbecomeamajor catalyst for structural
reform, thereby signiﬁcantly boosting economic growth in the euro area. Today, with the beneﬁt of
hindsight, we know that neither excessive pessimism nor exuberant optimism was justiﬁed.
Nonetheless, the Eurosystem has delivered a remarkable performance over its ﬁrst decade.”
“Now, what are the determinants of the Eurosystem’s success? Why did a currency area with no
track record of its own attain such a high degree of credibility in so short a time? As I have
already indicated, the bulk of conﬁdence in the ﬂedgling European single currency was gener-
ated by the Eurosystem’s institutional framework, which encompasses its independence, its
mandate and its monetary policy strategy, plus an institutional framework geared at
commanding the support of equally stability-oriented ﬁscal policies, as embedded in the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Key elements of this institutional framework have been
transferred to the Eurosystem from the national central banks (NCBs), including the Deutsche
Bundesbank. Consequently, with the transfer of parts of the NCBs’ structure and ethos, the
reputation of the currencies that were stable prior to EMU has lived on in the euro.”
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, in the years prior to the 2008–09 crisis hitting SWEAP, the market
may have underestimated the ﬁscal challenges facing the Euro block, believing that Weber’s position
“with the transfer of parts of the national central banks’ structure and ethos, the reputation of the
currencies that were stable prior to EMU has lived on in the euro” was accurate.
Has the SWEAP crisis has been a wake-up call regarding the ﬁscal vulnerabilities of the EuroZone?
Fig. 4 showsa scatter plotof governmentﬁscal space in2005–07prior to theﬁnancial crisis against2008–
10 prediction errors in Euro and non-Eurozone countries (using equations (6) and (8) from Table 3). The
left panels show the debt/tax revenue measure and the right panels show the deﬁcit/tax revenue ﬁscal
spacemeasure. The correlation in the Eurozone (non-Euro area) between government debt/tax revenues
andpredictionerror is0.72 (0.28). And the correlation in theEurozone (non-Euro area) betweenﬁscal
balances to tax revenues and prediction error is 0.59 (0.09) for other (non Euro) countries in the sample.
Euro area countrieswithhighdebtanddeﬁcits (surpluses)during thepre-crisisperiodexperienced lower
(higher) CDS spreads (relative to predicted values) than did the non-Euro area countries.
Overall, these data do not support the argument that the market was particularly sanguine about
Euro area sovereign risk during the tranquil period and that this led to an over-reaction (over pricing
risk) during the crisis period. CDS spreads relative to out-of-sample predicted values in the SWEAP
group are high, but not out of line with other country groups. Moreover, there is no evidence that debt
and deﬁcits in the SWEAP countries prior to the crisis led to high prediction errors during the crisis.
4.6. SWEAP compared to “matched” middle income countries
To gain further insight, we “match” the SWEAP countries with 5 middle-income countries (MI) that
in 2010, at the peak of the European crisis, were closest in terms of ﬁscal space (2010 debt/tax). The
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objective is to see if the pricing of risk in the SWEAP was different than corresponding MI countries.
The matches (SWEAP to MI), shown in Table 5, are Spain–South Africa, Greece–Panama, Ireland–
Malaysia, Italy–Mexico and Portugal–Colombia. These countries had similar debt to tax base ratios in
2010. The question is whether they had other similar economic characteristics, especially the price of
sovereign default risk.
Fig. 5 shows a cluster diagram of the prediction errors during these two periods, depicting the size
of debt/tax by circles. The prediction errors are based on the in-sample prediction errors from equa-
tions (2) and (4) in Table 3. The circle size is proportional to the 2005–07 pre-crisis public debt to tax
base ratio. There is a negative correlation (0.62) between 2005 and 07 pre-crisis and 2008–10 crisis
prediction errors, i.e. large (small) prediction errors in the tranquil period tend to be followed by small
(large) prediction errors in the crisis period. However, there is a wide asymmetry between the clusters
of errors of the SWEAP and the clusters of errors of their matched MI countries. In particular, the
relatively small prediction errors of the SWEAP countries in the pre-crisis period are followed by quite
large prediction errors in the crisis period. By contrast, little relation is seen in the error clusters of the
MI countriesda wide variation among the prediction errors in this group in the pre-crisis period is not
seen in the crisis period, during which time all of the matched MI country predictions were quite close
to realized CDS spreads.
The data in Fig. 5 suggest that sovereign risk in SWEAP countries is over-priced in comparison with
corresponding MI countries. Pursuing this further, Table 5 summarizes in more detail the character-
istics of the SWEAP with the matched countries. The table shows, before and during the crisis, the
evolution of CDS spreads, ﬁscal space, the tax base, inﬂation, currency depreciation, inﬂation external
debt, foreign reserves, trade openness and real GDP growth.
This table allows a detailed comparison of the matched countries. In terms of initial conditions, for
example, Italy and Mexico had very similar debt/tax ratios in 2005–07 (2.2–2.5), but Mexico had much
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Fig. 4. Market overreaction to ﬁscal pre-conditions. Based on the out-sample predictions eqs. (6) and (8) in Table 3 (as summarized
in Table 4). The prediction error is the actual CDS divided by the predicted CDS; when >1, there is a signal of under-prediction
(i.e. the sovereign default risk is over-priced). This ﬁgure plots 2008–10 prediction errors on CDS 5-year tenor on the vertical
axis. The 2005–07 ﬁscal space is on the horizontal axis.
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higher borrowing costs and sovereign CDS premiumwhichweremore than four times higher than Italy
(57 points versus 13 points). Differential borrowing costs, however, were consistent with a weaker
currency and higher inﬂation rates in Mexico. The difference in CDS spreads between the two countries
at this time appears is in line with relative ﬁscal spacedsimilar debt and deﬁcit positions– and
Table 5
Matching middle-income countries to SWEAP group.
Variable Year Spain South
Africa
Greece Panama Ireland Malaysia Italy Mexico Portugal Colombia
Sovereign CDS
5-year tenor
2005–07 16.7 53.2 15.0 115.1 8.6 29.2 13.4 57.2 10.4 138.0
2008 100.7 395.7 232.1 306.8 181.0 225.1 156.9 291.8 96.3 307.5
2009 113.5 143.3 283.4 133.4 158.0 89.6 109.2 133.3 91.7 142.8
2010 347.7 124.3 1026.5 99.5 619.2 72.7 238.0 112.8 497.3 113.0
2008–10 187.3 221.1 514.0 179.9 319.4 129.1 168.0 179.3 228.4 187.8
Public debt/
tax base
2005–07 1.1 1.3 3.2 5.7 0.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.9
2008 1.1 1.0 3.5 3.9 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.7
2009 1.5 1.1 4.0 3.8 2.2 3.7 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
2010 1.7 1.3 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.0
2008–10 1.4 1.2 4.0 3.9 2.3 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9
Fiscal balance/
tax base
2005–07 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
2008 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
2009 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1
2010 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1
2008–10 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Tax base ¼ avg.
(t  1,.t  5)
2005–07 34.6 25.1 32.3 9.8 29.4 16.0 41.5 17.2 33.3 18.9
2008 35.7 26.7 31.8 10.5 30.3 15.2 41.8 17.7 33.9 18.7
2009 35.5 27.4 31.9 10.5 30.3 15.2 42.1 18.5 34.3 18.6
2010 34.7 27.5 31.6 10.5 29.9 15.2 42.7 18.5 34.6 18.3
2008–10 35.3 27.2 31.7 10.5 30.2 15.2 42.2 18.2 34.3 18.5
Inﬂation (%) 2005–07 3.6 2.7 3.3 4.0 3.8 2.9 2.3 3.7 2.6 5.0
2008 1.4 8.2 2.6 6.8 4.1 4.5 2.3 6.5 0.7 7.7
2009 0.8 8.6 3.0 1.9 4.5 1.0 1.0 3.6 0.0 2.0
2010 2.8 5.6 17.3 4.9 1.3 2.1 2.1 4.4 2.5 3.2
2008–10 1.7 7.5 7.7 4.5 0.3 2.5 1.8 4.8 1.1 4.3
Nominal
depreciation (%)
(against US$)
2005–07 1.8 3.0 1.8 0.0 1.8 3.3 1.8 1.1 1.8 7.3
2008 5.0 17.3 5.0 0.0 5.0 3.0 5.0 1.8 5.0 5.3
2009 2.9 2.6 2.9 0.0 2.9 5.7 2.9 21.4 2.9 10.1
2010 5.4 13.6 5.4 0.0 5.4 8.6 5.4 6.5 5.4 12.4
2008–10 2.5 2.1 2.5 0.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 5.6 2.5 2.5
External debt/GDP 2005–07 1.4 0.1 1.3 0.6 7.8 0.4 1.1 0.2 1.9 0.2
2008 1.5 0.2 1.4 0.5 8.9 0.3 1.0 0.2 1.9 0.2
2009 1.7 0.1 1.8 0.5 10.7 0.3 1.2 0.2 2.3 0.2
2010 1.5 0.1 1.7 0.5 11.0 0.3 1.1 0.2 2.4 0.2
2008–10 1.6 0.1 1.7 0.5 10.2 0.3 1.1 0.2 2.2 0.2
Foreign reserves/
GDP (%)
2005–07 1.5 9.9 1.1 8.5 0.4 52.9 4.1 8.4 5.1 9.9
2008 1.3 12.3 1.0 10.5 0.4 41.6 4.6 8.7 4.8 9.8
2009 1.9 13.9 1.7 12.3 1.0 50.1 6.2 11.4 6.8 10.7
2010 2.3 12.0 2.1 10.1 1.0 44.8 7.7 11.6 9.2 9.8
2008–10 1.8 12.7 1.6 10.9 0.8 45.5 6.2 10.6 6.9 10.1
Trade/GDP 2005–07 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.5 1.5 2.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.4
2008 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.4
2009 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.3
2010 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.9 1.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3
2008–10 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.5 1.4 1.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4
Real GDP
growth (%)
2005–07 3.7 5.5 3.7 9.3 5.9 5.9 1.4 3.8 1.5 6.1
2008 0.9 3.7 2.0 10.7 3.0 4.7 1.3 1.5 0.0 2.7
2009 3.6 1.8 2.0 2.4 7.1 1.7 5.0 6.5 2.6 0.8
2010 0.2 2.8 4.5 7.5 1.0 7.2 1.3 5.5 1.3 4.3
2008–10 1.0 1.6 1.5 6.9 3.7 3.4 1.7 0.2 0.4 2.6
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economic performance. By 2010, however, the roles were reversed: Italy had a CDS spread of 238 and
Mexico 113, despite still having very similar debt/tax and deﬁcit/tax ratios and Mexico maintaining
higher rates of inﬂation. Pessimism about Europe in 2010 appears to have led to higher risk perceptions
in Italy compared to Mexico than would be justiﬁed by fundamentals. This observation is seen as well
in Fig. 5, where the prediction errors for 2008–10 averaged about 1.0 in Mexico and 2.6 in Italy. (It
should be noted, however, that real GDP growth was stronger in Mexico than Italy at this time, and its
currency stronger. So not all fundamentals pointed to more equal CDS spreads.)
Another illustrative case is Spain and South Africa. The 2005–07 (debt/tax) ratios were very similar,
but South Africa was subject to higher government borrowing costs and had a substantially higher CDS
spread (53 points versus 17 points). Partly this reﬂected the respective political situations but also that
South Africa had higher inﬂation and a higher rate of currency depreciation. Again, the market pricing
of risk was reversed in the two countries by 2010 with the CDS spread in Spain averaging 348 points
compared to 124 in South Africa. This difference may be partly due to fundamentalsdreal GDP growth
was higher and the debt/tax ratio lower in South Africa. On the other hand, the inﬂation rate in South
Africawas almost 6% in 2010, compared to less than 3% in Spain. The suspicion that default risk in Spain
is mispriced compared to South Africa is also suggested by the prediction error given in Fig. 5dthe
average CDS spread to predicted spread for Spain during 2008–10 is almost 4 but about 1 in South
Africa, where the later indicates no under- or over-pricing.
On the other hand, Table 5 also shows that SWEAP had lower foreign reserves than the matched MI
countries. Given the Euro status of SWEAP, however, it is uncertain what would be the role of the
reserves (compared to a precautionary rationale for reserves hoarding of the emerging markets).
Nonetheless, in all cases SWEAP countries had larger external debt (%GDP) and the government bond
markets that performed worse in 2010 than the matched MI countries.
In summary, there is strong evidence that high market default risk assessments in the SWEAP are
partly attributable to deteriorating fundamentals but that a large component is unpredicted. Actual
CDS spreads in the SWEAP much higher than what the model predicts, given the actual realization of
fundamentals. In terms of the model, these spreads may be “mispriced” due to excessive pessimism on
the part of market participants about the SWEAP or attributable to expectations of the further dete-
rioration of fundamentals. This point is well illustrated by a comparison of SWEAP with MI countries
with similar ﬁscal conditions. In every case, risk pricing of the SWEAP is comparatively high given
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current economic conditions. However, a comparison with other country groupings, outside of the
Middle Income countries, provides less support for relative over-pricing of risk in SWEAP. In particular,
other OECD countries (outside of the Eurozone) and non-SWEAP Eurozone countries have also
experienced very high CDS premiumsdmuch higher thanmodel predictionsdduring the crisis period.
The early 2012 selective default on Greek sovereign bonds, recognized as a “credit event” and triggering
payments of CDS, suggests that “mispricing” was not the issue but rather expectations of a high
likelihood of future deterioration in fundamentals triggering a default.
5. Conclusion
We develop a model of pricing of sovereign risk for a large number of countries within and outside
of Europe, before and after the global ﬁnancial crisis, based on ﬁscal space and other economic
fundamentals. We use this model to explain CDS spreads and determinewhether the market pricing of
risk is comparable in the affected European countries and elsewhere in the world. By this methodology
and using out-of-sample predictions, we determine whether there are systematically large prediction
errors for the CDS spreads during the global ﬁnancial crisis period 2008–10 and especially 2010 when
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe surfaced.
We ﬁnd that market-priced risk of sovereign debt as measured by CDS spreads is partly explained
by ﬁscal space and other economic determinants. Fiscal space is an economically important and
robust predictor of CDS spreads using a data set of more than ﬁfty countries over 2005–10, measured
either by government debt/tax base or government deﬁcits/tax base. In addition to validating that
ﬁscal space is an important determinant of market-based sovereign risk, we ﬁnd evidence of large
prediction errors in pricing SWEAP risk given current ﬁscal space and other current fundamentals:
unpredicted low CDS in tranquil period and unpredicted high during global crisis period, especially
2010 when sovereign debt crisis swept over Euro area. We also matched the SWEAP with 5 middle-
income countries outside Europe that were closest in terms of ﬁscal space (debt/tax) during the crisis
period. We ﬁnd that SWEAP default risk is priced much higher than the “matched” countries in 2010,
even allowing for differentials in ﬁscal space and other fundamentals.
On the other hand, outside of the Middle Income countries, several country groups experienced
similarly large prediction errors for CDS spreads during the crisis period, though the dynamics are
different than with SWEAP. Other OECD countries tended to have very high prediction errorsdhigh
CDS spreads compared with model predictionsdduring the ﬁrst year of the international ﬁnancial and
liquidity crisis (2008), while SWEAP experienced very substantial prediction errors in 2010 when the
sovereign debt crisis initially swept over Europe.
One interpretation of these ﬁndings is that the CDS market is pricing default risk not primarily on
current fundamentals but future fundamentals, expecting the SWEAP ﬁscal space to deteriorate
markedly. This interpretation is consistent with the selective default on Greek sovereign bonds in early
2012. The adjustment challenges of the SWEAP may be viewed as economically and politically more
difﬁcult due to exchange rate inﬂexibility associated with participation in the Euro area that is not
a constraint in the matched group of the middle income countries.
An alternative explanation, consistent with the multiple equilibrium model of Calvo (1988) and the
Euro Area picture painted by De Grauwe and Ji (2012), is that market-priced risk of sovereign default
follows waves of contagion, overreacting and mispricing risk of sovereign default over a period of
several years. In this view, sovereign risk was initially underpriced as contagious optimism, somewhat
divorced from fundamentals, predominated market expectations in the Euro Area, especially at the
time of the 10-year celebration of the success of the Euro Area. However, the “good” (optimistic)
expectational equilibrium quickly switched to a “bad” (pessimistic) expectational equilibrium in the
SWEAP countries in 2010 as markets overreacted to ﬁscal deterioration and generated extraordinarily
high CDS. Accordingly, persistent pessimism, manifested in high risk permia, induces further deteri-
orations of the balance sheet of a country, leading a self-fulﬁlling prophecy crisis.16
16 See also Obstfeld (1996) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for models of multiple equilibria.
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Both of these explanations are consistent with our empirical results and both have similar policy
implications. In particular, enforceable and binding rules on ﬁscal policy, perhaps combined with
greater centralization of Euro Area counter-cyclical ﬁscal responsibilities, would counter either
market expectations of future deterioration of future fundamentals or a switch from an “optimistic”
to a ﬁscally unsustainable “pessimistic” equilibrium.
Appendix A. Data sources
Sovereign CDS spreads The CDS pricing is based on London closing values collected from a consortium of over
thirty swap market participants.
CDS are denominated in US$, except for the following in Euro: ct, cz, dk, hn, ic, ln, mr,
po, rm, sx, sj, es, sd, tk, and ur.
Source: CMA Datavision.
Tax base The ratio of tax divided by GDP, averaged over the period of previous ﬁve years to
account for business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Source: World Bank’s WDI, IMF Article IV Consultation documents, OECD,
and Eurostat.
Fiscal balance/tax base The ratio of ﬁscal balance/GDP divided by tax base; positive ﬁscal balance means
ﬁscal surplus.
Source: World Bank’s WDI, IMF Article IV Consultation documents, and Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU).
Structural balance/tax base Adjusted for nonstructural elements, including temporary ﬁnancial sector, asset
price movements, revenue or expenditure items.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Public debt/tax base The ratio of public debt/GDP divided by tax base.
Source: IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, Article IV Consultation documents,
and World Economic Outlook.
Trade/GDP The ratio of (exports þ imports) divided by GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
Inﬂation Annual consumer price inﬂation (%).
Source: WDI and EIU.
External debt/GDP The ratio of total private and public external debt divided by GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
Nominal depreciation Annual depreciation of local currency against US$ (%).
Source: WDI and EIU.
REER Real effective exchange rate (2005 ¼ 100).
Source: WDI.
Foreign reserves/GDP The ratio of foreign reserves divided by GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
Real GDP growth Annual growth of real GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in US$.
Source: WDI and EIU.
TED spread The difference between the 3-month US$ LIBOR and the 3-month US
treasury bill (%).
Source: Datastream.
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Appendix B. Country details and average statistics for 2005–10
Group Country World
bank
Datastream CDS
5-yr.
CDS
3-yr.
CDS
10-yr.
Fiscal
balance/
tax base
Public
debt/
tax base
Trade/
GDP
Inﬂation
(%)
External
debt/GDP
Middle-income Argentina ARG ag 1075.29 1117.72 1124.23 0.07 4.40 0.43 9.42 0.46
Brazil BRA br 159.93 119.36 201.43 0.08 2.02 0.25 4.90 0.17
Bulgaria BGR bl 184.12 174.90 200.47 0.04 0.67 1.22 6.38 0.89
China CHN ch 65.01 54.53 74.05 0.09 1.13 0.62 2.97 0.10
Colombia COL cb 162.89 123.63 205.50 0.05 1.88 0.36 4.65 0.22
Indonesia IDN id 239.35 194.73 285.49 0.07 2.89 0.55 8.39 0.34
Kazakhstan KAZ kz 231.61 215.06 231.58 0.05 0.33 0.89 9.68 0.84
Lebanon LBN lb 355.40 313.76 390.27 0.65 10.98 0.69 4.30 1.12
Lithuania LTU ln 219.50 205.86 231.34 0.18 1.14 1.25 4.87 0.65
Malaysia MYS my 79.16 64.84 89.04 0.30 3.03 1.92 2.72 0.32
Morocco MAR mc 141.84 128.77 158.56 0.10 2.52 0.75 2.04 0.27
Panama PAN pa 147.52 112.87 186.98 0.03 4.80 1.49 4.25 0.53
Peru PER pe 161.63 124.87 201.94 0.06 2.20 0.48 2.59 0.27
Phillipines PHL ph 202.85 155.23 248.76 0.15 3.93 0.81 5.04 0.45
Romania ROM rm 224.50 225.68 243.59 0.14 0.87 0.74 6.52 0.54
Russia RUS rs 212.01 217.74 221.97 0.07 0.29 0.53 10.44 0.28
South Africa ZAF sa 137.14 121.33 157.06 0.06 1.22 0.61 5.08 0.14
Thailand THA th 95.42 81.22 109.01 0.08 2.68 1.40 3.24 0.26
Tunisia TUN tu 101.13 89.59 117.74 0.13 2.19 1.12 8.23 0.57
Ukraine UKR ur 898.71 930.54 898.67 0.08 0.68 0.97 13.71 0.57
Venezuela VEN ve 1024.69 1037.80 1011.23 0.20 2.49 0.52 22.82 0.23
Vietnam VNM vi 226.40 174.97 249.79 0.32 2.66 1.58 11.01 0.32
High-income
(non OECD)
Croatia HRV ct 175.44 160.03 185.98 0.16 1.71 0.87 3.01 0.85
Qatar QAT qa 78.93 63.71 100.60 0.45 0.80 0.87 8.02 0.58
South-West
Euro area
peripherals
(SWEAP)
Greece GRC gr 264.49 223.60 215.45 0.27 3.60 0.54 5.49 1.46
Ireland IRL ir 163.98 131.80 134.86 0.27 1.58 1.44 2.02 8.99
Italy ITA it 90.72 72.00 91.55 0.09 2.62 0.55 2.05 1.10
Portugal PRT pt 119.41 101.44 103.67 0.18 2.05 0.69 1.84 2.03
Spain ESP es 102.02 82.57 104.57 0.09 1.30 0.56 2.61 1.50
OECD
(non Euro)
Australia AUS au 41.52 32.55 49.27 0.02 0.46 0.40 2.91 0.95
Chile CHL cl 71.59 59.67 81.52 0.18 0.29 0.77 3.78 0.38
Czech CZE cz 65.23 54.69 73.90 0.09 0.87 1.47 2.72 0.41
Denmark DNK dk 50.59 35.87 61.70 0.04 0.84 0.98 2.20 1.72
Hungary HUN hn 189.46 169.18 184.27 0.15 1.86 1.54 5.16 1.01
Iceland ISL ic 288.02 303.63 266.12 0.07 1.47 0.81 7.15 6.77
Israel ISR is 81.52 67.28 96.03 0.06 2.30 0.80 2.68 0.52
Japan JPN jp 33.92 20.94 42.01 0.17 7.39 0.30 0.13 0.38
Korea KOR ko 97.59 89.40 107.91 0.03 1.23 0.90 3.14 0.35
Mexico MEX mx 118.24 97.59 142.15 0.05 2.31 0.58 4.27 0.19
Norway NOR nw 18.19 13.04 23.16 0.35 1.29 0.73 2.30 1.25
Poland POL po 96.25 82.10 102.61 0.07 1.48 0.81 2.67 0.46
Sweden SWE sd 52.76 37.19 66.38 0.03 0.88 0.94 1.68 1.86
Turkey TUR tk 201.54 165.60 242.63 0.10 1.78 0.49 8.13 0.39
Euro
(excluding
SWEAP)
Austria AUT oe 55.06 43.84 55.61 0.05 1.49 1.07 1.88 2.05
Belgium BEL bg 61.43 39.22 50.78 0.06 2.06 1.59 2.37 2.97
France FRA fr 34.58 24.04 34.78 0.10 1.61 0.53 1.74 1.75
Germany DEU bd 23.77 16.76 24.59 0.05 1.97 0.83 1.65 1.44
Netherlands NLD nl 45.84 33.15 68.73 0.04 1.43 1.39 1.65 2.98
Slovak SVK sx 58.41 49.48 66.85 0.13 1.06 1.73 2.92 0.57
Slovenia SVN sj 51.91 41.17 60.92 0.06 0.75 1.28 2.74 0.97
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Appendix C.1. Dynamics of CDS spreads 3-year and 10-year tenor
Appendix C.2. Dynamics of CDS spreads (continued)
Whole sample 2005–10 Tranquility 2005–07 Crisis 2008–10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CDS 3-year CDS 10-year CDS 3-year CDS 10-year CDS 3-year CDS 10-year
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
t2008 304.2 (102.3)*** 349.4 (104.2)***
t2009 10.9 (17.8) 13.9 (22.3)
t2010 63.9 (14.2)*** 66.7 (14.9)***
t2008  Euro
dummy
194.1 (82.2)** 232.9 (85.6)***
t2009  Euro
dummy
73.3 (30.5)** 91.5 (34.7)***
t2010  Euro
dummy
13.4 (20.9) 23.8 (19.2)
t2008  SWEAP 174.5 (90.6)* 210.6 (94.6)**
t2009  SWEAP 118.9 (31.4)*** 151.0 (34.9)***
t2010  SWEAP 226.4 (48.4)*** 158.7 (36.2)***
TED spread 0.5 (13.1) 1.4 (14.8) 35.3 (9.4)*** 28.8 (11.1)*** 155.1 (43.1)*** 134.0 (38.0)***
y(t  1) 0.3 (0.0)*** 0.3 (0.1)*** 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1)
Trade/GDP 20.9 (32.3) 38.1 (29.9) 70.3 (45.6) 126.8 (60.4)** 477.5 (245.3)* 438.5 (232.9)*
Inﬂation 22.3 (6.9)*** 25.0 (6.1)*** 6.4 (2.2)*** 12.1 (2.6)*** 27.2 (11.6)** 26.6 (10.6)**
External
debt/GDP
8.4 (1.8)*** 5.0 (3.0) 14.8 (9.6) 16.9 (14.8) 194.4 (138.7) 207.6 (120.7)*
Public debt/
tax base
15.4 (4.8)*** 13.3 (4.1)*** 112.9 (33.0)*** 127.1 (31.1)*** 211.2 (222.6) 263.8 (207.4)
Constant term 89.2 (31.0)*** 60.1 (24.3)** 1046.5
(391.0)***
1122.3
(366.7)***
686.8 (1123.5) 743.4 (917.8)
R2 0.42 0.48 0.75 0.88 0.56 0.58
Observations 300 300 150 150 150 150
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fixed
effects (i)
No No No No No No
Serial
correlation
y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1)
Clustered
s.e. (i)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table provides a robustness check to Tables 2 and 3 across CDS 5, 3, and 10 tenor. The dependent variable (y) is sovereign
CDS 3-year and 10-year tenor in basis points. SWEAP includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Tax Base is an average
Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. TED Spread (3-month US$ LIBOR 3-month US treasury) and Inﬂation are in percent.
All variables are in realtime (t), except the lagged CDS, y(t  1). Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting
statistical signiﬁcance at 1 (5,10) level.
y ¼ CDS in level y ¼ CDS in 1st difference
Whole sample 2005–10 Whole sample 2005–10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coeff.(s.e.) coeff.(s.e.) coeff.(s.e.) coeff.(s.e.)
t2008 372.1 (91.3)*** 378.0 (100.9)***
t2009 38.5 (17.3)** 10.5 (22.4)
t2010 42.8 (16.2)*** 63.4 (14.4)***
t2008  Euro dummy 261.4 (75.7)*** 260.1 (86.1)***
t2009  Euro dummy 64.2 (36.9)* 53.1 (34.4)
(continued on next page)
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Appendix C.3. Structural balance, REER, and dynamics of CDS spreads
Appendix (continued )
y ¼ CDS in level y ¼ CDS in 1st difference
Whole sample 2005–10 Whole sample 2005–10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coeff.(s.e.) coeff.(s.e.) coeff.(s.e.) coeff.(s.e.)
t2010  Euro dummy 24.3 (32.0) 27.4 (26.9)
t2008  SWEAP 274.5 (80.1)*** 250.4 (94.9)***
t2009  SWEAP 79.8 (50.1) 100.0 (43.6)**
t2010  SWEAP 242.5 (63.1)*** 260.0 (62.2)***
TED spread 0.5 (11.8) 10.1 (15.5) 103.8 (10.9)*** 70.7 (13.3)***
y(t  1) 0.3 (0.0)*** 0.3 (0.0)*** 0.7 (0.0)*** 0.7 (0.0)***
y(t  1) 0.8 (0.0)*** 0.7 (0.0)***
y(t  1) 0.8 (0.1)*** 0.1 (0.1)
Trade/GDP 46.0 (27.3)* 23.0 (31.2) 273.2 (40.8)*** 186.8 (34.5)***
Inﬂation 24.3 (5.7)*** 30.3 (6.5)*** 0.3 (1.4) 3.7 (1.9)**
External debt/GDP 0.7 (3.5) 6.2 (5.3) 128.2 (20.7)*** 38.3 (8.9)***
Fiscal balance/tax base 134.2 (56.7)**
Fiscal balance/GDP 10.1 (4.0)**
Public debt/tax base 240.3 (14.8)***
Public debt/GDP 1.5 (0.4)***
Constant term 31.8 (28.2) 150.4 (41.4)*** 88.8 (9.9)*** 52.1 (10.2)***
R2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.44
Observations 300 300 100 100
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50
Fixed effects (i) No No Yes Yes
Serial correlation y(t  1) y(t  1) Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond
Clustered s.e. (i) Yes Yes – –
p-value: Sargan tests – – 0.617 0.85
AR(1) tests – – 0.241 0.984
This table provides robustness checks to results in Tables 2 and 3. The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 5-year tenor in
basis points. SWEAP includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Tax base is an average tax/GDP over a period of previous
5 years. TED Spread (3-month US$ LIBOR 3-month US treasury) and Inﬂation are in percent. The Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions has a null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. The AR(#) test has a null of no autocorrelation in # differences. All
variables are in realtime (t), except the lagged CDS. Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical
signiﬁcance at 1 (5,10) level.
Balanced (whole) sample: 2005–10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
t2008 318.1 (122.4)*** 329.8 (123.6)*** 324.7 (123.3)*** 302.2 (126.8)**
t2009 192.2 (144.2) 142.3 (144.2) 174.7 (145.4) 269.1 (145.5)*
t2010 236.0 (131.4)* 204.8 (132.1) 224.0 (132.4)* 302.2 (135.9)**
t2008  Euro dummy 241.4 (219.9) 248.8 (222.2) 252.3 (221.6) 220.8 (234.0)
t2009  Euro dummy 186.9 (221.7) 209.8 (223.8) 206.2 (223.2) 150.7 (237.5)
t2010  Euro dummy 171.0 (216.7) 186.0 (218.9) 194.2 (218.4) 89.9 (231.4)
t2008  SWEAP 224.3 (257.0) 201.2 (259.5) 209.5 (258.8) 329.0 (254.4)
t2009  SWEAP 582.2 (260.4)** 581.0 (263.2)** 597.1 (262.7)** 656.5 (258.4)**
t2010  SWEAP 1807.5 (255.7)*** 1845.3 (257.9)*** 1935.8 (264.3)*** 1895.7 (254.5)***
TED spread 303.9 (110.3)*** 295.8 (111.4)*** 280.8 (111.5)** 289.4 (114.6)**
y(t  1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.2 (0.1)
Trade/GDP 18.5 (86.6) 39.2 (84.0) 26.1 (84.3) 54.5 (92.0)
Inﬂation 85.7 (10.9)*** 82.3 (10.9)*** 81.8 (10.9)*** 78.3 (9.6)***
External debt/GDP 17.0 (20.2) 19.5 (20.4) 16.2 (20.4) 17.9 (21.6)
Public debt/tax base 65.5 (27.6)** 53.3 (27.5)*
Structural balance/tax base 538.6 (365.7) 852.9 (344.6)** 1226.6 (425.7)***
Fiscal balance/tax base 469.6 (315.7)
REER 3.3 (3.2)
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Appendix (continued )
Balanced (whole) sample: 2005–10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
Constant term 570.0 (145.9)*** 397.6 (127.9)*** 419.5 (128.4)*** 179.1 (336.7)
R2 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.48
Observations 234 234 234 216
Countries (i) 39 39 39 36
Fixed effects (i) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Serial correlation y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1) y(t  1)
Clustered s.e. (i) No No No No
The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 5-year tenor in basis points. South-West Euro Area Periphery (SWEAP) includes
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Tax Base is an average Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. TED spread (3-month
US$ LIBOR  3-month US treasury) and Inﬂation are in percent. Structural balance is the general balance adjusted for
non-structural items. Real effective exchange rate (REER) is re-based to 100 in 2005. Subject to data availability, the following
countries are missing due to Structural balance variables: HRV, KAZ, LBN, MAR, MEX, PAN, PHL, QAT, TUN, VEN, VNM; and due to
REER variables: ARG, BRA, IDN, KAZ, KOR, LBN, LTU, PAN, PER, QAT, SVN, THA, TUR, VNM. All variables are in realtime (t), except
the lagged CDS, y(t  1). Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical signiﬁcance at 1 (5,10) level.
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